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Walter Lippmann (1889-1974) was one of the most distinguished commentators of 
the late-industrial epoch. As a prominent pundit—‘the writer who professes to interpret 
and to criticize current events in social affairs’ (Lippmann 1937, p. 3)—in what it is 
now safe to call the golden era of the press, his long-running op-ed piece Today and 
Tomorrow was syndicated in hundreds of American newspapers, as well as being 
eagerly received in capital cities across the globe; his was also the flagship column for 
the start-up Newsweek. A wordsmith of marvellous productivity, dexterity and lucidity, 
Lippmann coined, or at any rate established, such influential terms as ‘cold war’, ‘public 
opinion’, ‘public philosophy’, and ‘the manufacture of consent’. His counsel to a 
succession of presidents literally changed history. He saved Hoover from an asinine 
invasion of Mexico. For Wilson he formulated most of the Fourteen Points upon which 
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the post-war international order was based. He improved Kennedy’s inaugural speech 
by changing ‘enemy’ to the less confrontational ‘adversary’ in its reference to the Soviet 
Union. Johnson courted Lippmann more than any, only to fall out over the latter’s brave 
opposition to the Vietnam war. Equally importantly, he was a guide for the ordinary 
perplexed, a role crassly captured in a New Yorker cartoon where a housewife confides 
that all she needs in the morning is her cup of coffee and Walter Lippmann.  
All of this is well-documented (Nimmo & Combs 1992; Steel 1999). Yet Lippmann 
was more than just a fully paid-up member of the punditocracy, and some of his outputs 
possessed more than ephemeral value. He was also an original thinker, publishing 
numerous works of what can broadly be classed as social theory and philosophy, 
specialising in the problems of modern democracy. It is important to be candid at the 
outset that he was not ‘the most important American political thinker of the twentieth 
century’ (Rossiter & Lare 1982, p. xvi), a distinction now obviously belonging to John 
Rawls. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Lippmann, who, except for incessant 
genuflectory citations of his classic Public Opinion, has suffered something of a 
reputational eclipse, remains highly relevant to our time. Indeed, the thesis of this article 
will be that Lippmann should be read as an important early theorist of the new age, of 
the ‘information society’. If he was a seer of the twentieth century, his piercing gaze 
reaches down into our own epoch. If he addressed the problems the Great Society posed 
for democratic theory (Riccio 1994, p. 59), he also foresaw issues dogging Post-
Industrial Society and the Network Society (Bell 1999; Castells 2000)—or so I wish to 
argue.  
Specifically, the Lippmann corpus contains materials that can help us with the 
following important questions. First, what exactly is the role in a democracy of 
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information, especially in its three key forms of news, opinion and expertise? Second, 
what is the basic nature of social morality, of the norms that ought to guide collective 
action, and how can these be translated into a viable (post)modern theory of the good 
society? Third, are we in danger of succumbing to technological determinism and the 
power of a technocracy, and if so, what is to be done? Such are clearly critical issues for 
any intelligent contemporary citizenship. 
The approach here will be more reconstructive than historical. That is to say, I shall 
attempt to isolate—using archival as well as published sources—the most usable 
elements of Lippmann’s thought from the point of view of their applicability to the 
information society. This marks something of a departure, in that scholars have tended 
to stress changes in his analyses and prognoses. For example, a major critical study 
alleged that Lippmann espoused no less than five distinct, even incommensurable, 
public philosophies, positions united only by a common style (Wright 1973). That is 
probably a misrepresentation, missing the substantive commonalities, especially 
Lippmann’s lifelong commitment to socially-responsible liberal democracy. 
Nevertheless, it is true that both his ‘world view’ and the shade of his left-leaning 
politics underwent remodulations, sometimes agonistic ones. However, instead of 
dwelling overlong on these I intend to locate what is best in Lippmann’s ideas, taking 
away from the material as a whole the strongest possible synthesis. Although some 
contextualisation will be helpful, the essential point is to find what works today for the 
perils confronting our technological, informatised democracies. In this way, I hope to be 
able to demonstrate that the ‘ideal’ Lippmann will serve admirably as a sentinel for the 




Information Problems of the Democratic Polity 
 
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a 
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: 
And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power 
which knowledge gives. (James Madison, 1822) 
 The necessity of wide information-dissemination in a democracy is a venerable 
political truism, one expressed with unsurpassed elegance by the great United States 
constitution-maker. In up-to-date terms, we might say that an informed citizenry is part 
of the grammar of the concept of democracy, or that there is an internal relation between 
a democratic polity and certain kinds of information. It is a nexus upon which 
Lippmann was uniquely-qualified to comment. To his journalism career and Harvard 
degree in philosophy and politics, his resumé could add high-level personal experience 
in war propaganda on behalf of the Allied cause (Lippmann 1965; Steel 1999, pp. 141-
154). In this section, I will concentrate on three monographs that the precocious 
Lippmann devoted to information issues, namely Public Opinion (1922) and two shorter 
works, Liberty and the News (1920) and The Phantom Public (1993 [1927]). The 
subject matter of the trilogy can be summed up as the role, both actual and imaginable, 
of information, particularly in its modes of news, opinion, and science or ‘expertise’, in 
a complex, large-scale liberal democracy. It is this preoccupation that makes it possible 
to begin to think of Lippmann as an information society theorist.  
The central message of the texts was that modern democracy suffers from a 
systemic information deficit. The ideal of politics, much like the ‘perfect information’ 
of classical economics, is a fully-informed citizenry. Such citizens would be capable of 
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generating the public opinion that is ‘the prime mover in democracies’ (Lippmann 1922, 
p. 171). But sound public opinion must be based only on ‘objective information’, on 
facts (Lippmann 1920, p. 57). As this supreme opinion-writer always stressed, ‘we must 
go back of our opinions to the neutral facts for unity and refreshment of spirit’ 
(Lippmann 1920, p. 70). The premise of the fully-informed, indeed ‘omnicompetent’, 
citizen was built into classical and early modern theories of democracy, not least those 
hammered out by the founding fathers of the United States (Lippmann 1922, pp. 181-
182, 243). However, this idyllic model had been realised only in the ancient Greek city-
states or the town-hall meetings of the small face-to-face communities of the nascent 
American republic. Such societies ran on public opinion because their chief 
disagreements were over judgements based on the same facts, on shared contact with 
the real or primary environment. There was no need to ‘guarantee the sources of 
information’ because these were ‘accessible to all’, or, at any rate, to all male property-
owners (Lippmann 1922, p. 185). 
 Unfortunately, such was by Lippmann’s day far from still being the case. In 
complexified conditions of population explosion, industrialisation, and mediated 
politics, democracy was now radically informationally under-determined. Most people 
had contact now not with the vast political environment but only with a second-hand 
reality, a ‘pseudo-environment’ (Lippmann 1920, p. 55). They were like the captives in 
Plato’s cave, dependent for the ‘pictures in their heads’ on representations concocted by 
others (Lippmann 1922, p.  24). The basic drawback of public opinion, Lippmann 
determined (1993, p. 45), is that ‘its relation to a problem is external’. While modern 
democratic theorists hailed information as the currency of political legitimacy, what 
they neglected to explain was precisely how the sovereign populace would be kept 
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informed enough to cast wise votes and make sound decisions. The American founders 
had legislated for checks and balances, for the education of children, for copyright and 
the incentivisation of knowledge, but they did invent any institutions of political 
information. Certainly the public library system was a step in the right direction, yet 
there were still intolerable information gaps.  
 In lieu of state provision, the private press had to act as the chief institution of 
information and opinion, but it was not fulfilling this vital role properly. Indeed, the 
dysfunctionality of the mass media was at the heart of the problem, according to 
Lippmann. Newspapers could not cover everything and what they did report they tended 
to distort by the use of ‘stereotypes’ and other expedients of pressured, space-limited 
communication (Lippmann 1922, p. 58f.). They fashioned their own reality, a 
necessarily partial, oversimplified, and stylised one. News, Lippmann insisted, is not co-
extensive with truth, but it was the only version of the truth about the wider world that 
most people could know. Acting upon the masses for perhaps half an hour per day, the 
press was expected to create a ‘mystical force called Public Opinion that will take up 
the slack in public institutions’ (Lippmann 1922, p. 243). Moreover, powerful media 
owners and editors had angles to push, further compromising the objectivity of news. 
But even if they were reporting pure truth systematically, there was still the problem of 
cognitive overload. People simply did not have time to absorb information on every 
issue or the energy to form innumerable opinions. Given that the citizen is too busy, and 
in many cases too apathetic, it was inevitable that a two-step flow would set in, and 
mediating institutions would relieve the sovereign citizen of his burden and do his 
political thinking for him. 
 This was the intrinsic nature of the media beast, but it was not the whole story. 
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Newspapers themselves were in any case manipulated by powerful forces behind the 
scenes. State censorship was only the most obvious. The executive branch of 
government, armed with exclusive access to inside information by means of official 
documents, intelligence and cables, ruled through the mass media, largely 
circumventing parliaments and judiciaries. Even Congress, lacking its own effective 
means of information other than on local issues, was largely impotent (Lippmann 1920, 
pp. 59-60). Powerful special interests also knew how to play the media. Employers’ 
organisations, trade unions and the like now had a disproportionate influence on policy; 
this led to a polity of pressure groups (Lippmann 1920, pp. 61-62). The upshot is that 
the public finds that it is ‘blockaded’ from the pure sources of information (Lippmann 
1920, p. 11). The fourth estate was just not constituted to do the full resourcing of 
genuine debates, to supply the ‘machinery of knowledge’ (Lippmann 1922, p. 244).  
 Such considerations induced Lippmann to propose greater social control of the 
means of communication. The press’s distorted and episodic searchlight needed to be 
improved by a new machinery if it were to give a reliable picture of a complex world. 
Thus Lippmann posited a new information institution, in essence a fifth estate. This 
took two forms. Liberty and the News suggested a publicly-funded, professionally-
trained, centralised international news-agency, something approximating what is now 
the BBC and its clones across the western world, whose role would be to inform policy-
makers, press and public alike (Lippmann 1920, pp. 92-94). By Public Opinion, 
however, Lippmann’s view had hardened in favour of a full scientification of 
information-gathering and –distribution, something quite separate from, and apparently 
superceding, the press. Experts organised into permanent intelligence bureaus—the 
Census Bureau and Geological Survey were already promising examples—would 
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prepare the facts exclusively for politicians and other insiders (Lippmann 1922, pp. 249-
252). Citing H. G. Wells, Bernard Shaw and other Fabians, this seminal text gave every 
impression of envisaging a full state-socialism not of the economy but of data and 
knowledge. The future system of news-information would be comprehensive, 
continuous, and arguably totalitarian. 
 The end-result of all this is that in one way or another people are subject to the 
‘manufacture of consent’ (Lippmann 1922, p. 169). It is important to be extremely clear 
here. Those exegetes err who cast Lippmann, as Chomsky and Herman (2002) among 
others have done, as a fan of propaganda or even, as Frank Webster (2006) alleges, of a 
milder ‘information management’, of spin. While Lippmann should be credited with 
coining the phrase—actually in Liberty and News (1920, p. 62)—he emphatically does 
not endorse the practice. On the contrary, his argument is precisely that because public 
opinion can be controlled it cannot be trusted. However, it must be conceded that there 
was indeed a realist—that is, elitist— strain in Lippmann’s thought. He did not accept 
that public opinion was the same thing as the public interest. Lynching was popular but 
it was anything but democratic. Moreover, public opinion, even if well-informed, is 
essentially neither wise nor rational. The politician’s real duty is to follow the public 
interest, not the results of Gallup polls (Lippmann quoted in Rossiter & Lare 1982, p. 
99). In a much later work, Lippmann reaffirmed his conviction (1989, p. 42) that the 
public interest should be defined as ‘what men would choose if they saw clearly, 
thought rationally, [and] acted disinterestedly and benevolently’. 
 The Phantom Public drew some sobering conclusions. The public can perform only 
a secondary and occasional role, helping politicians when they are fighting a just cause, 
as a reserve of force brought into action during an election or a crisis (Lippmann 1993, 
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p. 61). The people certainly had the right to decide who should rule; and between 
elections, they also sometimes had to be listened to. But their role is limited. Lippmann 
(1993, pp. 115-132) even attempted to lay down a series of formal conditions whereby 
one could tell in particular instances whether public opinion should be heeded. Barry 
Riccio (1994, p. 72) accurately characterises these nostrums, which few readers found 
convincing, as a form of ‘proceduralism’. One might now say too that the role of 
Lippmann’s public is binary, confined to yes/no decisions. None of this implies that 
Lippmann was not an authentic democrat (Schudson 2008). He never denied that public 
opinion in its broadest scope is ultimately the foundation on which political legitimacy 
in the modern world rests, never gave up on his avowal of liberal-democracy in its 
fundamental sense as government of the people, by the people, and for the people.  
 
The Post-Industrial Age 
 
 This was strong meat, but what is the significance for us of Lippmann’s remarks? It 
could be argued that the information problems of the democratic polity no longer exist 
in post-industrial society, at least not in such an acute form. Surely we are light years 
away from the antediluvian era of information scarcity, when everyone waited with 
bated breath for the deliverances of a few grand newspapers? We are the information 
society, the society characterised by an abundance and diversity of information. We 
enjoy transparency, an open society. The information system is no longer anything like 
so oligarchic, nor so top-down, nor so censored, nor so provincial. We are no longer 
helpless hostages of a pseudo-environment. The ‘expressive mechanisms of public 
opinion’ (Lippmann n.d.) have multiplied. Indeed, our ‘info sphere’ (Floridi 2007, p. 
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59) is positively bulging, not only because of dynamic global mass media but also 
courtesy of the web and all the sources, conduits and modalities that that now embraces. 
Having experienced partial disintermediation, we construct our own pictures in our 
heads. We have easy access to colossal quantities of raw, unfiltered information; we 
cannot be blockaded anymore. We watch the proceedings of parliaments on television, 
follow politician tweets, stay up-to-date with breaking news on blogs, compare online 
newspapers from all over the world, and fire off freedom of information requests at will. 
We have the Alexandrian Library on our laps, indeed in our palms, more or less free of 
charge. We have direct contact with even the most remote environments through 
webcams and other surveillant devices. And, as Michael Schudson notes (2010), we 
now also have numerous ‘political observatories’, expert organs of information-
gathering and processing, from civil service agencies to political think tanks. So surely 
opinion in advanced societies must now be as informed and rational as necessary for the 
functioning of a healthy democratic system? 
 Some of this may be readily granted, but it is foolish to infer that the information 
deficit has thereby been eliminated. As a matter of brutal empirical fact, mainstream 
public opinion is still largely manufactured by a limited, privileged set of media outlets. 
The ideas in our heads are still put there by more or less the same news agencies, papers 
and broadcasters. Stereotypes are stubbornly durable. The masses remain deeply 
suggestible, hardly signalling the demise of mass society. Pseudo-events dazzle more 
than ever before. Media-caused spirals of silence force uneasy closure to debates, 
applying sharp pressures to conform, perhaps more so than in the past, especially with 
sensitive issues in cultural politics: this demonstrates again and again the 
untrustworthiness of outwardly-expressed viewpoints. The public sphere is dominated 
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by public relations, advertisers, and pressure groups. Public service broadcasting is 
everywhere on the defensive. News is less and less treated as a public good worthy of 
protection from the vagaries of market forces. Intellectual property rights are expanding 
at the expense of the intellectual commons and open discussion. Governmental and state 
power-elites and their bureaucracies still rule largely as they please: they have just 
evolved along with the changing information environment, becoming more circumspect 
in information and message management, hence usually able to ride out the occasional 
leak, FOI exposure, or media scandal. One has to deal with the actual, not the potential, 
and to recognise that the engineering of consent is still standard even among the most 
supposedly sophisticated electorates. Public opinion, in short, is still a plaything of the 
powerful. 
 Moreover, the rosy picture is in any case only (partially) true for some. However 
narrow and synthetic the pseudo-environment of the reasonably affluent, politically-
aware majority, it is far healthier than that of the worst off sections of society. 
Longstanding information inequalities persist, now complicated by the unwelcome 
phenomenon of digital divides (e.g. Norris 2001; Gilbert 2010). To social stratifications 
originating in the economic setup and property relations have been added new forms of 
estrangement, marginalisation and excommunication. Even Japan, arguably the first and 
greatest ‘joho shakai’ (info-communications society) is still very much a ‘kakusa 
shakai’ (gap society). And of course, divisions of all kinds, not least informational, are 
growing inexorably between nations, as the World Summit on the Information Society 
registered. There is a new mode of information, to be sure, but the emergent world  is 
still composed of unequal and under-informed electorates. The progressive politics of 
information, frankly, are still in their infancy. ‘For decades’, Susan Herbst (1999, p. 88) 
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concurs, ‘we have believed that the information revolution—the expansion of the mass 
media into all aspects of our lives—would enable common folks to rise to the ideal-
typical behavior and knowledge levels expected of them in democratic theories. Yet 
with each passing decade we realize just how far American democracy is from the 
imagined democracies of our founders, and it was the skeptical and erudite Lippmann 
who first brought us the bad news’.  
 Lippmann’s observations should also give us pause for thought about the utopian 
claims made on behalf of cyberdemocracy. His early books inspired a response at the 
time from the eminent US philosopher John Dewey. In his reviews and then in The 
Public and its Problems (1927), Dewey stood for direct democracy against Lippmann’s 
formulas for representative government. This debate has occasioned a considerable 
recent literature, most of it predictably siding with Dewey (Whipple 2005; Crick 2009; 
Allan 2010). Dewey’s ideas are seen as being more in harmony with the political ideals 
of the information age, in particular with the vision of an internet-facilitated ‘comeback’ 
of participatory democracy (Whipple 2005: 157). Yet Lippmann’s work points to the 
dangers in this ‘deliberative turn’ (Dryzek & Dunleavy 2009, p. 216; see also Robbin et 
al. 2004). The inflated view of human agency that the Network Society is encouraging 
could be delusional. Pushbutton voting simply places too much faith in public opinion, 
running the old risk of a crude majoritarianism. We are already seeing this tendency in 
the trend of ‘flashmobs’, instantaneous mass-protests coordinated on social network 
sites, which have much in common with the lynch mobs of the industrial era. The 
dangers of emotionalism, of unreflective action, of people voting or protesting from 
deep inside their pseudo-environments, their opinions made up largely of stereotypes, 
are arguably essentially the same as they were in the heyday of the Ku Klux Klan.  
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 The issue is not the worthiness of deliberative democracy as an ideal, but its 
applicability to real life. Lippmann saw that true discursive freedom is not about a 
‘series of separate soap boxes’; it can ‘achieve its essential purpose only when different 
opinions are expounded in the same hall to the same audience’ (Lippmann 1939?, pp. 
11-12). The model is not an internet galaxy of innumerable separate worlds but the 
focused cut-and-thrust of the American Senate or the British Parliament (Lippmann 
1939?, p. 13). More recently, Stefan Rummens (2012) has explained these merits of 
representative institutions, of what he calls the ‘stage’ over the ‘fora’ and ‘network’ 
conceptions of democracy. Caution should not entail that we have to settle entirely for 
Lippmann’s binary public, surveilling at a distance the office-bearers of the ‘procedural 
republic’—to borrow Michael Sandel’s (1996) excellent descriptor—with only an 
occasional yes-no decision. However, it does mean that we should recognise that 
democracy’s pendulum may be beginning to swing a little too wildly from elitism to 
populism. At the very least, disaffected citizenries need to face up to the fact that 
democracy will not be restored by ‘imagining that some new political gadget can be 
invented’ (Lippmann quoted in Rossiter & Lare 1982, p. 186).  
 Nevertheless, Lippmann’s work can spur radical thinking about the possibility of 
new information institutions. He was correct that democracy—in whatever form—will 
only realise its optimal potential when there is a much more efficient and 
comprehensive supply of information, especially hard-news information. What is plain 
in this post-industrial epoch is that there is a lingering cybernetic problem, in the sense 
that no one can honestly say that we have, not even in the most progressive polities, 
pure information flowing into decision-making and politics being continuously refined 
by systematic feedback from sound public, scientific, or political opinion. The solutions 
 14 
 
Lippmann toyed with, especially those involving expert, centralised systems, are 
probably past their sell-by dates. There may still be a strong case for the maintenance of 
large-scale public service broadcasting operations, but that type of institution will not be 
able to single-handedly informatise the democracies of the future. Something additional, 
an institution or set of institutions specially attuned to a networked, distributed, and 
globalised socio-technical environment, seems to be needed. Musing on the Lippmann-
Dewey debate, Scott Aikens (1999, p. 190) professes himself hopeful that ‘with 
distributed systems as the building blocks of a new machinery of knowledge, a new 
politics of personal liberty within socially cohesive communities might be a realistic 
aim’. Perhaps, perhaps not. But information society theorists will certainly soon need to 
come up with the blueprints of the institutional infrastructure for a well-ordered post-
industrial polity. 
 
Normative Foundations of Public Policy 
 
The demythologising of public opinion is all very well, but from where then can we 
find the ethical coordinates of political action? How do we rise above the ‘gangster 
level’ (Lippmann 1937, p. 15) of propaganda and force? More particularly, where does 
Lippmann’s critique leave information societies like our own, beset as they are by the 
‘widespread fading of certitudes’ (Castells 2006, p. 6) and the ‘breakdown of social 
norms’ (May 2003a)? Like his British contemporary R. H. Tawney, Lippmann was at 
heart a social moralist, a spectator of the militarized zone between moral values and 
political order, and he would have agreed with the radical professor that the challenge is 
not so much the accumulation of information as ‘to have a keen sense of right and 
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wrong’ and to ‘realize that the conceptions “right and wrong” apply to all relations of 
life’ (Tawney 1972, pp. 30, 79). But if so, how do we arrive at these conceptions and 
what exactly is their content? Lippmann’s whole career can be read as a response to that 
question, as a journey in pursuit of the criteria of moral-political truth. The fact that his 
eventual answer—natural law—is even less popular today than it was when Lippmann 
announced it, does not necessarily mean that he was mistaken.  
In his early work, Lippmann had articulated the positivism and relativism that held 
sway over much of the intelligentsia of his day. Repudiating traditional morality in both 
A Preface to Politics (1913) and A Preface to Morals (1982), he championed science, 
especially social science, not least in the shape of Freudian ideas about the prevalence 
of the irrational in human behaviour. ‘Our conscience’, he assured his readers, ‘is not 
the vessel of eternal verities’ (Lippmann 1913, p. 59). In The Phantom Public, too, he 
inveighed against absolutism. ‘Even the successful practice of a moral code would not 
emancipate democracy. There are too many moral codes (Lippmann 1993, p. 20). While 
he recognised that, within the boundaries of a single society, there could be a common 
code, a political theorist who asks that a local standard be universally applied is merely 
begging one of the questions he ought to be trying to solve (Lippmann 1993, pp. 20-21). 
For the political order that we recognize as good, he wrote in pragmatist style, is one 
suited to ‘our needs, hopes, and habits’ (Lippmann 1993, p. 23). Bluntly, there is no 
point appealing to ‘a universal moral code, which, in fact, does not exist’ (Lippmann 
1993, p. 25).  
These youthful dogmas could not satisfy for ever. The crisis of modernity 
demanded better answers: 
In an incredibly short time, a mechanical and industrial revolution has altered the whole pattern 
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has altered the whole pattern of American life. It has uprooted millions from the land and thrust 
them into a strange, incomprehensible, and rapidly changing environment. So vast, so deep, so 
pervasive are the effects of this upon the premises of our conduct, upon the internal economy of 
our own spirits, that we find ourselves not only without common publicly acknowledged 
standards of action but oftener than not without clear personal convictions as well. (Lippmann 
1931, p. 5) 
In his later work, notably The Good Society and then The Public Philosophy, Lippmann 
came round to the view that there is, in fact, just such an objective moral order, one 
which lays down norms of conduct, a ‘natural’ or ‘higher law’ that translated into 
‘traditions of civility’ for both private and political life (Lippmann 2005 [1937], p. 352; 
1989 [1955], p. 3; see also Diggins 1991). This, the ‘perennial philosophy’ (Lippmann 
quoted in Rossiter & Lare 1982, p. 132), comprises a system of universal norms 
deriving from the nature of things and standing over and above all man-made statutes. 
‘That which is lawful for all stretches endlessly through the broad aether and the vast 
brightness’, Empedocles had written circa 450 BC (Barnes 1979, p. 123). In a timeless, 
transcendent realm of unshakeable ‘oughts’, Lippmann believed that he too had found, 
at last, the pre-political foundations of constitutional democracy. And this natural law, 
not pragmatism or other mode of modernism, should comprise the ‘public philosophy’ 
of the US—indeed, any progressive—polity.  
Lippmann’s understanding of natural law centred on a conception of the dignity of 
the person. Man is not just a thing, a chemical object, but has an inner essence 
(Lippmann 2005, pp. 351, 379). He does not belong to the state, because he belongs to 
another ‘realm’, a spiritual one (Lippmann 1989, p. 150). And men (he included 
women) are created equal (Lippmann 2005, pp. 346-351). The body of basic moral 
intuitions constitutive of natural law points in certain directions for human co-existence. 
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It underwrites a set of human rights and duties, thereby supplying, at its best, a solid 
normative foundation for political liberalism. While difficult to pin down forensically, 
certain general rules were an obvious part of its core. These include proscription of 
practices such as cruelty, torture and the killing of the innocent, alongside prescription 
of such duties as reciprocity, assistance to neighbours and strangers, child welfare, 
protection of the environment, liberty of conscience, speech and religion, and 
humanitarianism (Lippmann 1989, pp. 79-80, 117). All such rules are non-negotiable: 
Lippmann would have heartily joined Rawls (1971, pp. 2-3) in asserting that ‘people 
possess an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society cannot 
override’, that ‘the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to 
the calculus of social ends’.  
Unlike Rawls and most other latter-day liberals, however, Lippmann perceived that 
social morality must sometimes act as a conservative force, including in the regulation 
of information flows. For example, he took what today looks like a strikingly moralistic 
line against obscenity. He used the editorial columns of the World to denounce a David 
Belasco Broadway play called Ladies of the Evening, whose ‘purpose is to go just a 
little further than any other manager has gone in presenting the dirty accompaniments of 
vice’ (Lippmann 1924). In terms that would dismay the vast industry of present-day 
media-studies apologists for what used to be called smut, he saw no place for 
pornographic magazines on news-stands. ‘There is no more reason’, he thundered, ‘why 
these things should be displayed on the streets than that the garbage should be dumped 
in City Hall Park’ (Lippmann quoted in Steel 1999, p. 209). ‘Believing as I do in 
freedom of speech and thought’, he clarified on another occasion, ‘I see no objection in 
principle to censorship of the mass entertainment of the young’ (Rossiter & Lare 1982, 
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p. 448). So Lippmann, like many another old-school public philosopher, realised that 
freedom of speech is not absolute, that liberty should not degenerate into license. 
However, he also grasped that the level of censorship depends logically on the nature of 
the medium and in particular on its degree of opportunity for response, or what we 
would call interactivity (Lippmann 1939?, pp. 15-16; Rossiter & Lare 1982, pp. 232-
233)—and on this principle, we may presume to infer, the internet should remain less 
regulated than television and other monological mass media. 
Moreover, if natural law pointed right on cultural issues, it swung leftwards in 
economics. While it upheld private property, natural law also demanded responsible 
stewardship of resources. Just wages and prices, public amenities, educational 
provision, sharing of wealth, relief of the poor, duties of care—in short, the welfare 
state: all these were priorities of a civilised society and all of them Lippmann felt able to 
deduce from natural law. Even radically counter-intuitive policies such as Keynesian 
deficit-financing, which would hardly be appreciated by majority opinion, were 
supportable by natural-law reasoning. It must be conceded that Lippmann’s 
socioeconomic position underwent revisions (Wellborn 1969; Jackson 2012). There are 
undeniable differences between the Webbs- and Wallas-citing Preface to Politics and 
the Mises- and Hayek-citing Good Society, but they can be exaggerated. In the former, 
Lippmann could be heard warning against Marxism, and in the latter his political 
economy still found substantial space for state interference. The truth is that Lippmann 
was always against the extremes of both proletarianism and plutocracy, always safely 
within the boundaries of the centre-left, of social democracy. He was a lifelong 
subscriber to socialism in Daniel Bell’s (1996, p. xii) undoctrinaire sense of ‘a judgment 
on the priorities of economic policy’. Indeed, the closer one inspects his political 
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philosophy, the more one is inclined to say of Lippmann what Bell famously said of 
himself (1996, p. xi), that he was ‘a socialist in economics, a liberal in politics and a 
conservative in culture’. 
The profound normative resource that Lippmann identified as the basis of a viable 
public philosophy is accessible to the faculty of reason. Indeed, reason is the 
representative within us of this universal order. ‘There are certain principles’, he 
insisted, ‘which, when they have been demonstrated, only the willfully irrational can 
deny’ (Lippmann 1989, p. 114). ‘The rational order’, he explained further—anticipating 
by more than a generation the content and even vocabulary of Rawls’s seminal Political 
Liberalism (1996)—‘consists of the terms which must be met in order to fulfill men’s 
capacity for the good life in this world. They are the terms of the widest consensus of 
rational men in a plural society. They are the propositions to which all men concerned, 
if they are sincerely and lucidly rational, can be expected to converge’ (Lippmann 1989, 
p. 123). As a genetic human trait, natural law could be a platform for a rough-and-ready 
cosmopolitanism. More than that, ‘men who live in this tradition are capable of 
brotherhood’ (Lippmann quoted in Rossiter & Lare 1982, p. 166). There was no elitism 
here. On the contrary, by being so broadly available, natural law was profoundly 
populist, unlike the sophisticated ethical systems of the intelligentsia.  
 
Toward the Good Information Society` 
 
 Naturally, Lippmann’s conversion to natural law was not received enthusiastically 
by most of his peers (Steel 1999, p. 496). The weightiest criticism came from Benjamin 
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Wright, an expert on the history of natural law. According to this scholar, there were at 
least eight different interpretations in the US alone between the 17th and 20th centuries, 
ranging in political colouring from ‘extreme radical’ to ‘ultraconservative’ (Wright 
1973, p. 143). Calling Lippmann’s own interpretation ‘facile’, for example in its over-
reliance on ‘antithesis’ when ‘what is needed is the making of distinctions’, he 
concluded that his espousal of natural law was basically ‘out of joint with his time’ 
(Wright 1973, pp. 146, 150, 153). It would play even worse, of course, with most 
intellectual trends in our own day. From Anglo-American analytical philosophy to 
European postmodernism—not to mention the recent ‘pragmatic turn’ back to Pierce, 
James and company (Bernstein 2010), these being precisely the influences Lippmann 
shook off—the attack on foundationalism in general, and natural law in particular, has 
been relentless. The legacy of positivism still makes us suspicious of anything that 
cannot be proved in a test tube or by mathematical demonstration. And Foucauldian 
arguments to the effect that all truth claims are in any case infested by power, a stance 
that of course goes back to Marx and Mannheim, have also made a major impact. There 
is some support for natural law, ‘neo-Thomists’ such as John Finnis (2011) and, among 
Protestants, ‘public theology’, a school which may even have been inspired by 
Lippmann (Forrester 1997, p. 199). But they are still very much on the periphery of 
modern thought. ‘The prospects of a “deep” or “thick” public philosophy’, George 
Carey fears (2001, p. 26), ‘seem out of the question for some time to come’. Indeed, he 
concludes that ‘the evidence is overwhelming that the restoration of even a “thin” public 
philosophy is highly improbable’ (Carey 2001, p. 27; see also Bohman 1999). 
 The idea of natural law was and always will be grossly unfashionable, but for its 
defenders that is just an indication of its validity. ‘The public philosophy cannot be 
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popular’, Lippmann stated forthrightly (1989, p. 162). Humans have two selves, the 
higher and the lower, the rational and the barbaric, and life is a continual struggle to 
assert the former over the latter. If natural law were popular, the world would be a very 
different place, it would be an Eden. Such a conception, at its best, acts as an antidote to 
the ‘acids of modernity’ (Lippmann 1982) and, a fortiori, of postmodernity. Indeed, the 
public philosophy qua higher law is the consummation of the critique of fickle, free-
floating, self-interested public opinion. Lippmann had always believed that it is the 
pundit’s duty to elucidate the nature of the good society and it was only here, in an 
unashamed return to first principles, that the vox pop could really meet its match. Or in 
older political language, it enabled him to affirm lex rex against rex lex, that law, not 
the king, or the state, or even, in a sense, the public, is sovereign. This was how one 
could justify the priority of essence over appearance, reason over emotion, justice over 
mob rule.  
 The information society has long wanted some such input, as its master mind 
intimated. In an afterword to The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, a text that had 
cited Lippmann frequently and respectfully, Bell (1996, p. 298) hinted at his own late 
move to natural law. He said that he had come to see that the antinomianism of the 
twentieth century could not sustain political liberty or any other civilised value. ‘There 
is a need to affirm a single standard of human rights, without which no individual has 
recourse against the arbitrary power of the state to degrade, torture, and slaughter those 
who dissent from that power’—which is what, suggested the father of post-
industrialism, ‘a doctrine of “natural law” would provide’ (1996, pp. 337-8). It might 
seem perverse for post-industrialism to want to appropriate a doctrine so far removed 
from any appeal to science or technology, but perhaps at a deeper level the paradox 
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disappears. In a famous broadcast to the British nation as it braced itself for Hitler, C. S. 
Lewis (1942, p. 30), another thoughtful contemporary, said that the whole point about 
the idea of a universal moral law was that it gave us ‘inside information’ about the 
constitution of the universe and even the meaning of life. In that profound sense it can 
surely provide some kind of basis for a normative theory of the information society. 
Who knows? Natural law may even prove to be our best tool for tackling the staggering 
problems that will bedevil us throughout this century, of digital and other information 
divides, of privacy versus surveillance, of the sustainability of freedom of information 
and opinion, of superpowers over-against international law, of the governance of space 
and cyberspace.  
 
Endgame? The Future as Technocracy 
 
 There is another factor which—above and beyond the preoccupation with 
information’s role in society, and the moral and political implications thereof—tips the 
balance decisively in favour of a reinterpretation of Lippmann as an information society 
theorist: his engagement with, in Heideggerian parlance (1977), ‘the question 
concerning technology’. It is a schoolboy error to think that the information society is 
solely about computers and telecommunications. However, a comprehensive 
understanding of the process of informatisation does indeed need to include an analysis 
of its technological, and especially information-technological, dimensions, and it is my 
contention that the Lippmann oeuvre provides enough in this respect. We have, in 
particular, an unfinished manuscript, The Ungovernability of Man (1970), written 
towards the end of his life, where Lippmann set down his mature thoughts about the 
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prospects of civilisation in the technological world that he saw crystallising rapidly 
around him. One or two scholars have noticed it (e.g. Whitfield 1981, p. 68), but none, 
as far as I am aware, has highlighted it. Incomplete though it was, this fascinating 
fragment demonstrates that Lippmann had a share of the rare gift possessed by the best 
pundits: an ability to look into the future. In this final section I will let his voice speak 
loudly, keeping exegesis to a minimum. 
 As noted above, young man Lippmann had put much of his faith in the special 
mode of information that is called science. He expected, as many of that era did, that 
social problems no less than natural ones would soon melt under the concentrated fire of 
the scientific method. Science seemed indeed destined to govern politics. Fretting over 
the information dilemmas of democracy, as we have seen, Lippmann specifically 
recommended an intelligence bureau running the show. In some ways, it might be said, 
this Lippmann resembled the Bell of the 1970s (e.g. 1971; 1999 [1973]; see also Miller 
1976), extolling a post-industrial society based on the codification of theoretical 
knowledge, that is, big science, and its systematic application to government policy. 
 The unpublished manuscript confirms a change of mind, and of mood. The mature 
Lippmann did not negate science, of course, but now he could see more clearly its 
drawbacks. ‘Only in our time, only in the twentieth century,’ he writes (1970, p. 1), ‘has 
the application of science been developed to a point where scientists are capable of 
changing radically not only the environment of man but intervening drastically in the 
nature of man himself’. This high-tech scenario has brought ‘the promise of the creation 
of a new environment and of a new social order’ (1970, p. 2). And information and 
communication technologies have been a key driver, alongside nuclear power, 
contraception and pharmaceuticals. ‘Telecommunication’, Lippmann notes, reprising 
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his epistemological concerns although now the problem was not too little but too much 
popular contact with the outer world, ‘has placed men beyond the limits of their direct 
knowledge and beyond the limits of what is familiar to them’ (Lippmann 1970, p. 4). 
Moreover, the scale and pace of the changes are phenomenal. Sounding very much like 
Alvin Toffler in Future Shock (1970) and perhaps also with a hint of Marxian, or at any 
rate nineteenth-century, determinism, he asserts that ‘we can hardly begin to realize the 
consequences of the condition where a new order already exists within us and within the 
order to which we belong. It is probable that in historical times there has always been 
within an established order a new order struggling to be born but change has never been 
so rapid’ (Lippmann 1970, p. 6).  
 Morally-politically, normatively, the nascent, promethean socio-technical system 
will present huge challenges. ‘In the new technological order’, Lippmann writes (1970, 
p. 3), ‘men assume so many of the functions of the gods, that there is little room left for 
the great central ideological cathedrals of religion and certainty’. ‘The conflict between 
technology and the ancestral order’, he proceeds, ‘is I believe the central source from 
which flow our tensions, our disorders and a swelling unease among us’ (Lippmann 
1970, p. 2). ‘The habits’, he explains, ‘implanted during eons of adaptation no longer 
agree with needs and functions of the new technological order’ (Lippmann 1970, p. 3). 
Essentially, system is clashing with culture. Furthermore, ‘there is little doubt that the 
technological order will dominate the conflict’ (Lippmann 1970, p. 4-A). Specifically, 
and worryingly, the new system is threatening to extinguish the amalgam of Christian 
and Enlightenment values that is western culture. ‘The ascendancy of the technological 
order demands a break with the christian values of western civilisation, and also with 
the revolutionary ideology which, since the eighteenth century, has identified 
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democracy with  egalitarianism’, Lippmann writes (1970, p. 4A). The vital principle 
that was at risk, which lay at the heart of modern western culture, was human equality, 
the understanding that ‘all men are not only equal in the sight of God, but are 
irreducibly equal as individuals—in their rights, in their status, in their competence’ 
(Lippmann 1970, p. 4A).  
 The endgame will be a divided society, a brutal technocracy. On the one hand, there 
will be an elite, the people who possess technology: ‘they are the strongest people and 
they become stronger by using technology’ (Lippmann 1970, p. 4A).  On the other side, 
there are the havenots, subject to the ‘dominance of a vital technology which few of the 
ever-growing population understand or are competent to manage, in which a 
considerable and growing minority are not needed and are not qualified and are not 
wanted.’ (Lippmann 1970, p. 5). This leads not just to drastic socioeconomic turbulence 
but also to a pervasive governance problem. ‘The interactions and interrelationships, 
which only some imaginary computer could deal with, are, perhaps, enough to intimate 
the disorders and the discontents and ungovernability of mankind’, Lippmann writes 
(1970, p. 12). And the ‘breakdown’, he warns, is at all levels, undoing ‘not only world 
government, a world order, but national order and national government and even 
regional government’. His final thoughts are with the young: 
What can old men say to them? For if mankind is to be saved, those who are now young must save 
it. Yet the young who are so inexperienced and ignorant must somehow, themselves, find the 
knowledge to save it. What then have the old people learned that can be of any use to the young? 
(Lippmann 1970, pp. 14-15) 
 There he breaks off. Lippmann’s swansong thus presents a very stark vision, 
showing little of the subtleties and qualifications, still less the optimism, of his earlier 
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writing. It is basically a doomsday scenario, technology as unstoppable juggernaut, 
trashing every cultural relic. I am not suggesting that the manuscript is particularly 
original or profound. Indeed, it seems to be predicated on the cardinal intellectual sin of 
technological determinism. But it is still salutary. It puts technology at the centre of 
Lippmann’s social analysis, for the first time. It points to the normative crisis that others 
today are beginning to grasp. It suggests that we need to look deeper than we normally 
do when we debate ‘governance’. It implies that the real fight now is against 
technocracy. And it suggests that we need to restart, at a different level and on a wider 
front, the perennial battle for political liberty and equality. All such propositions should 





 The role of the pundit is not to soothe; it is to contribute to the public use of reason, 
to speak truth to power. Pace Randall Collins (2011), Lippmann was that kind of 
pundit, a successful public intellectual who served as a ‘bridge’ between expertise and 
policy-making (Goodwin 1995, p. 340). But to his recognised accomplishments an 
additional dimension now needs to be added—Lippmann as prophet of post-
industrialism, as information society theorist. Certainly to a greater extent than either 
Jurgen Habermas or Anthony Giddens, whom Webster (2006) does not hesitate to 
include, or the likes of Karl Polanyi and Raymond Williams (May 2003b)—for none of 
that illustrious group really thematises centrally the concept of information—Lippmann 
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can be counted among the theorists of the information society avant la lettre.  
 I hope to have demonstrated precisely how Lippmann fulfils this role. He was not 
just a model commentator, eloquent, informed, and often wise, one from whom both the 
press and the blogging brigades can learn, but also a serious thinker who produced 
substantive contributions to questions that have become even more acute than when he 
wrote. It has been argued that his reflections on the nature of information and its socio-
political role, on public opinion and democracy, on liberty, justice and the good society, 
and on technology, can significantly enhance our understanding of the post-industrial 
societies in which so many of us find ourselves. We must above all heed his signature 
mantra that ‘the health of society depends upon the quality of the information it 
receives’ (Lippmann 1920, p. 80) and, I think, the corollary that it is ultimately the 
state’s responsibility to protect the flow of pure information. This article has 
emphasised too that Lippmann’s case for natural law should not be dismissed out of 
hand. Something, at any rate, needs to be found for the renormativisation of society, for 
the sourcing of a better infopolitics. In such ways, then, it can perhaps be safely 
concluded that Lippmann indeed wrote for his tomorrow as well as his today. He can be 
a sentinel of this cyber century, and so it is entirely fitting that, nearly a hundred years 
after Lippmann co-founded The New Republic, the flagship liberal weekly has been 








Aikens, G. S. (1999) ‘Deweyan systems in the information age’, in Digital Democracy: 
Discourse and Decision Making in the Digital Age, eds. B. N. Hague and B. D. Loader, 
Routledge, London, pp. 179-194. 
Allan, S. (2010) ‘Journalism and its publics: the Lippmann-Dewey debate’, in The 
Routledge Companion to News and Journalism, ed. S. Allan, Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 
60-70. 
Barnes, J. (1979) The PreSocratic Philosophers, vol. 1: Thales to Zeno, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London. 
Bell, D. (1971) ‘Technocracy and politics’. Survey: A Journal of East & West Studies, 
vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 1-15. 
————— (1996) [1976] The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Basic Books, 
New York. 
————— (1999) [1973] The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social 
Forecasting, Basic Books, New York. 
Bernstein, R. J. (2010) The Pragmatic Turn, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Bohman, J. (1999) ‘Citizenship and norms of publicity: wide public reason in 
cosmopolitan societies’, Political Theory, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 176-202. 
Carey, G. W. (2001) ‘On the degeneration of public philosophy in America: problems 
and prospects’, Perspectives on Political Science, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 21-26. 
 29 
 
Castells, M. (2000) The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, vol. 1: The 
Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed.,  Blackwell, Oxford. 
————— (2006) The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, vol. 3: End 
of Millennium, 2nd ed. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Chomsky, N. and Herman, E. S. (2002) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy 
of the Mass Media, Pantheon, New York. 
Collins, R. (2011) ‘Who has been a successful public intellectual?’, European Journal 
of Social Theory, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 437-452. 
Crick, N. (2009) ‘The search for a purveyor of news: the Dewey/Lippmann debate in an 
internet age’, Critical Studies in Media Communication, vol.  26, no. 5, pp. 480-497. 
Dewey, J. (1927) The Public and its Problems, Henry Holt & Co, New York. 
Diggins, J. P. (1991) ‘From pragmatism to natural law: Walter Lippmann’s quest for the 
foundations of legitimacy’, Political Theory, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 519-538. 
Dryzek, J. S. & Dunleavy, P. (2009) Theories of the Democratic State, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London. 
Finnis, J. (2011) Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Floridi, L. (2007) ‘A look into the future impact of ICTs on our lives’, The Information 
Society, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 59-64.  




Gilbert, M. (2010) ‘Theorizing digital and urban inequalities: critical geographies of 
‘race’, gender and technological capital’, Information, Communication & Society, vol. 
13, no. 7, pp. 1000-1018. 
Goodwin, C. D. (1995) ‘The promise of expertise: Walter Lippmann and the policy 
sciences’, Policy Sciences, vol. 28, pp. 317-345 
Habermas, J. (2006) ‘Political communication in media society: does democracy still 
have an epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research’, 
in Europe: The Faltering Project, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 138-183. 
Heidegger, M. (1977) The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, trans. 
W. Lovitt, Harper & Row, New York. 
Herbst, S. (1999) ‘Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion revisited’, Harvard International 
Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 88-93. 
Jackson, B. (2012) ‘Freedom, the common good, and the rule of law: Lippmann and 
Hayek on economic planning’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 47-68. 
Lewis, C. S. (1942) Broadcast Talks, The Centenary Press, London. 
Lippmann, W. (1913) A Preface to Politics, Mitchell Kennerley, New York. 
————— (1920) Liberty and the News, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, New York. 
————— (n.d.) ‘The expressive mechanisms of public opinion’, Lippmann Papers, 
Box 219, folder 305. [Fragment of early draft of Public Opinion], pp. 1-2. 
————— (1922) Public Opinion, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York. 
 31 
 
————— (1924) ‘A cheap skate on Broadway’, The World (New York), December 
26, Lippmann Papers, Box 214, folder 242, pp. 1-2. 
————— (1931) ‘Address at dinner of the Academy of Political Science’, Hotel 
Astor, March 25, Lippmann Papers, Box 227, folder 350, pp. 1-15. 
————— (1937) ‘Lecture at the New School for Social Research’, New York City, 
May 3, Lippmann Papers, Box 231, folder 496, pp. 1-16. 
————— (1939?) ‘Broadcasts, soapboxes, and debates’, Lippmann Papers, Box 252, 
folder 22, pp. 1-18. 
————— (1965) ‘Early years’, Lippmann Papers, Box 217, folder 294, pp. 1-9. 
————— (1970) ‘The ungovernability of man’, Lippmann Papers, Box 223, folder 
327, pp. 1-15. 
————— (1982) [1929] A Preface to Morals, Transaction, New Brunswick, NJ. 
————— (1989) [1955] The Public Philosophy, Transaction, New Brunswick, NJ. 
————— (1993) [1927] The Phantom Public,Transaction, New Brunswick, NJ. 
————— (2005) [1937] The Good Society, Transaction, New Brunswick, NJ. 
Madison, J. (1822) ‘Letter to W. T. Barry’, August 4. [online] Available at 
http://www.thefederalistpapers.org (accessed 10 August 2012) 
May, C. (2003a) ‘Digital rights management and the breakdown of social norms’, First 




(accessed 10 August 2012) 
—————, ed.(2003b) Key Thinkers for the Information Society, Routledge, London. 
Miller, S. M. (1976) ‘The coming of the pseudo-technocratic society’, Sociological 
Inquiry, vol. 46, nos. 3-4, pp. 219-221. 
Nimmo, D. and Combs, J. E. (1992) The Political Pundits, Praeger, New York. 
Norris, P. (2001) Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the 
Internet Worldwide, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, New York. 
————— (1996) Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York. 
Riccio, B. D. (1994) Walter Lippmann: Odyssey of a Liberal, Transaction, New 
Brunswick, NJ. 
Robbin, A., Courtright, C., and Davis, L. (2004) ‘ICTs and political life’, Annual 
Review of Information Science and Technology, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 411-482.  
Rossiter, C. and Lare, J., eds. (1982) The Essential Lippmann: A Political Philosophy 
for Liberal Democracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Rummens, S. (2012) ‘Staging deliberation: the role of representative institutions in the 




Sandel, M. J. (1996) Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Schudson, M. (2008) ‘The “Lippmann-Dewey debate” and the invention of Walter 
Lippmann as an anti-democrat 1986-1996’, International Journal of Communication 2: 
1-12. 
————— (2010) ‘Political observatories, databases and news in the emerging 
ecology of public information’, Daedalus, vol. 139, no. 2, pp. 100-109. 
Steel, R. (1999) [1980] Walter Lippmann and the American Century, Transaction, New 
Brunswick, NJ. 
Stelter, B. (2012) ‘New Republic gets an owner steeped in new media: new-media guru 
Chris Hughes’, The New York Times, 9 March, p. B2(L). 
Tawney, R. H. (1972) [1914] The Commonplace Book, eds. J. M. Winter & D. M. 
Joslin, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Toffler, A. (1970) Future Shock, Random House, New York. 
Webster, F. (2006) Theories of the Information Society, 2nd ed., Routledge, London. 
Wellborn, C. (1969) Twentieth Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public 
Philosophy, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LO. 
Whipple, M. (2005) ‘The Dewey-Lippmann debate today: communication distortions, 




Whitfield, S. J. (1981) ‘Walter Lippmann: a career in media’s rays’, Journal of Popular 
Culture, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 68-77. 
Wright, B. F. (1973) Five Public Philosophies of Walter Lippmann, University of Texas 
Press, Austin, TX.  
 
 
 
  
 
